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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper jointly assesses the impact of regulatory reform for corporate 
fundraising in Australia (CLERP Act 1999) and the relaxation of ASX admission rules in 
1999, on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in initial public offer (IPO) 
prospectuses. The relaxation of ASX listing rules permitted a new category of new economy 
firms (commitments test entities (CTEs)) to list without a prior history of profitability, while 
the CLERP Act (introduced in 2000) was accompanied by tighter disclosure obligations and 
stronger enforcement action by the corporate regulator (ASIC).   
Design/methodology/approach – All IPO earnings forecasts in prospectuses lodged between 
1998 and 2003 are examined to assess the pre- and post-CLERP Act impact. Based on active 
ASIC enforcement action in the post-reform period, IPO firms are hypothesised to provide 
more accurate forecasts, particularly CTE firms, which are less likely to have a reasonable 
basis for forecasting. Research models are developed to empirically test the impact of the 
reforms on CTE and non-CTE IPO firms. 
Findings – The new regulatory environment has had a positive impact on management 
forecasting behaviour. In the post-CLERP Act period, the accuracy of prospectus forecasts 
and their revisions significantly improved and, as expected, the results are primarily driven 
by CTE firms. However, the majority of prospectus forecasts continue to be materially 
inaccurate.  
Originality/value – The results highlight the need to control for both the changing nature of 
listed firms and the level of enforcement action when examining responses to regulatory 
changes to corporate fundraising activities. 
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1.  Introduction 
Around the turn of the century, major changes occurred in Australian corporate fundraising 
and continuous disclosure regulations, accompanied by increases in their level of 
enforcement. These changes included tighter guidelines for disclosing earnings forecasts in 
prospectuses, and increases in sanctions for continuous disclosure contraventions brought 
about by the various stages of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). 
Following these changes there were significant increases in the level of prospectus stop 
orders issued by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the introduction 
of criminal penalties, and on-the-spot fines imposed by the ASIC. The nature of firms listing 
on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)1 also changed with the amendment to ASX 
Listing Rule 1.3.2(b) in 1999, which allows a certain category of firms to list without a prior 
history of profitability (commitments test entities (CTEs)). To address the fact that most CTE 
firms are smaller and riskier than other listed entities, the ASX introduced ASX Listing Rule 
4.7B, which generally requires CTEs to submit quarterly cash flows reports for at least two 
years after initial listing. These firms are therefore likely to be significantly different in their 
disclosure behaviour than more traditional initial public offer (IPO) firms that listed prior to 
1999. 
 
Information disclosed in IPO prospectuses about future earnings expectations is considered 
highly relevant in informing investors about investments in new share issues. However, 
doubts about the reliability of such information are an ongoing concern of regulators in 
Australia and in other countries. Prior research suggests such concerns are justified with most 
Australian studies finding earnings forecasts contained in IPO prospectuses tend to be highly 
inaccurate (Lee, Taylor, Yee and Yee 1993; Hartnett and Romcke 2000; Gallery, Gallery and 
Ryan 2002; Chapple, Clarkson and Peters 2005).  However, apart from Chapple et al. (2005), 
researchers have not examined the earnings forecasting behaviour of IPO firms in Australia’s 
more recent regulatory environment. Chapple et al. (2005) find that the quantity of IPO 
earnings forecasts declined post-CLERP Act (1999), but found no evidence of a change in 
forecast quality as measured by forecast accuracy (error and bias). They attribute their 
findings to a reduction in litigation risk associated with fundraising regulatory changes in 
2000 and suggest that their results “confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk 
affect the level but not the quality of disclosure” (p.67).   However, Chapple et al. (2005) do 
not control for other changes that could have contributed to changes in forecasting behaviour, 
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particularly the change in the nature of IPO firms (the admission of CTE companies to ASX 
listing) that occurred concurrently with the CLERP reforms.  
 
We therefore extend the Chapple et al. (2005) study by re-examining IPO forecasting 
behaviour of firms listed on the ASX between January 1998 and December 2003 – a similar 
study period to Chapple et al. (2005), but extended by one year. Similar to Chapple et al. 
(2005), we expect that IPO forecasting frequency has declined post-CLERP Act, but in 
contrast to their findings, we expect the quality of forecasting (as measured by the accuracy 
of prospectus forecasts and their revisions) to have improved in the later time period after 
controlling for  CTE firms. Furthermore, we expect that CTE firms are the main contributors 
to the changing forecasting behaviour due to their closer scrutiny by the ASX and ASIC in 
the post-reform period. In contrast to Chapple et al. (2005), our expectations are premised on 
an increase in regulatory enforcement over the post-CLERP Act period leading to an increase 
in litigation risk rather than a decrease in litigation risk. 
 
Consistent with these expectations, our results show that regulatory changes and increased 
enforcement in the post-CLERP Act period have been effective in increasing the accuracy of 
prospectus earnings forecasts. Additionally, we find a noticeable improvement in the 
accuracy of revisions (the final forecast updates prior to the actual earnings announcement 
date).2 Our results reveal that the observed improvement in forecasting behaviour is primarily 
driven by the CTE IPO firms rather than the traditional, non-CTE IPO firms. Importantly, 
these results highlight the need to control for both the changing nature of listed firms and the 
level of enforcement action when examining the responses to regulatory change. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
Australian corporate fundraising and continuous disclosure regulations as well as extant 
literature on the determinants of disclosure, the prospectus earnings forecast properties of 
IPO firms and the quality of management earnings forecast disclosures. Section 3 outlines the 
relevant theory and develops hypotheses, while Section 4 discusses the research design 
utilised to test these hypotheses. Section 5 presents an analysis of the data and the results of 
hypotheses testing. Finally, Section 6 summarises the findings and implications of the study. 
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2. Overview of regulatory changes 
Commencing in 1999, a series of wide-ranging changes were made to Australian corporate 
regulations, supported by an increase in their enforcement by the ASIC and ASX. Among 
those changes were new and amended provisions under legislation and ASX Listing Rules 
which directly impacted corporate fundraisings activities and disclosure obligations of IPO 
firms. The key changes relate to fundraising regulations under the Corporations Act, 
admission to listing under the ASX Listing Rules, and the application and enforcement of 
continuous disclosure provisions under both the Corporations Act and ASX Listing Rules. A 
summary of these changes is presented in Table 1 and discussed below.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here]  
 
2.1 Corporations Act - Fundraising Regulations 
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act 1999 (Cth) commenced on 13 
March 2000 and revised corporate fundraising regulation by introducing a single liability 
regime for inaccurate prospectuses. Prior to the Act, liability in relation to misleading 
forecasts in prospectuses arose through competing regimes. The (then) Corporations Law 
s995 and s996 prohibited false or misleading statements in, or omissions from, prospectuses, 
and s1005 governed civil liability where any person suffered loss or damage as a result of the 
contravention.  An overlap of liability can arise under misleading and deceptive conduct (s52) 
through the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which has wider application than s995 of the 
Corporations Law. Additionally, the common law remedy of contractual misrepresentation 
applies.  
 
Australian fundraising regulation is now largely contained in Chapter 6D of the Corporations 
Act 2001,3 including provisions governing the contents of disclosure documents, the 
procedures for offering securities, disclosure document advertising, and remedies for 
investors who acquired securities under a defective disclosure document. Issues relating to 
disclosure in prospectuses are governed by Part 6D.2, Div 3 and 4. Specifically, s710 
provides a general test requiring the disclosure of all the information that investors and their 
professional advisers would reasonably require, whereas s711 provides for specific 
disclosures4. False or misleading statements in, or omissions from, prospectuses are 
prohibited under s728, with  s728(2) requiring earnings forecasts to be based on reasonable 
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grounds. A breach of s728 will give rise to criminal liability under s728(3) and civil 
proceedings under s729(1). Those potentially liable are the issuer, directors and proposed 
directors, underwriters, and certain experts and advisors. Defenses to both criminal and civil 
liability are contained in ss731–733, whereas remedies for investors are contained in s737-
738. 
 
The CLERP Act removed the requirement for prospectuses to be registered with ASIC. 
Prospectuses need only to be lodged with ASIC.  Following lodgement the company must 
observe a seven-day exposure period to allow the market a chance to review the prospectus 
(prior to its official public “issue”). During this period, subscriptions cannot be accepted. Part 
6D.4 of the Corporations Act governs ASIC’s powers, among which s739 gives ASIC the 
power to issue a stop order on a company’s prospectus if it believes that s728 has been 
breached. ASIC also requires the lodgement of a supplementary prospectus in the event that a 
company’s forecast changes significantly between the issue of the initial prospectus and 
listing. However, the issue as to whether managers subsequently correct materially inaccurate 
prospectus forecasts once listed on the ASX is caught by the continuous disclosure 
regulations (discussed below). 
 
In response to concerns about “blue sky” forecasts, ASIC released Information Memorandum 
(IR 01/05) in February 2001 advising of tighter guidelines governing financial forecasts and 
projections in prospectuses. These guidelines form the basis of Policy Statement PS170: 
Prospective Financial Information, replacing Practice Note PN67: Financial Forecasts in 
Prospectuses in September 2002, with some significant changes. PN67 did not set out when 
prospective financial information5 (forecasts) must be included in the prospectus but simply 
left it to the judgement of company directors to assess the need on a case-by-case basis 
(67.2). In contrast, PS 170 provides provisions on when forecasts can or should be disclosed 
(170.2, 170.4-170.15) and provides a general test of whether forecasts must be disclosed 
(170.13). While both PN67 and PS170 state that forecasts must not be included unless they 
are based on “reasonable grounds”,6 PS170 provides a range of indicative factors as to what 
are reasonable grounds for disclosing forecasts (170.16-170.50). 
2.2 Changes to ASX Admission Rules  
During the late 1990s, some securities exchanges relaxed their listing rules to facilitate capital 
raisings for emerging ‘new economy’ companies. Most notably, amendments to the 
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NASDAQ Listing Standards in 1997 permitted listing of firms which had no prior history of 
profitability. In contrast, at that time the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required all 
firms to show three years of profitability prior to listing (Klein and Mohanram 2005).7  
 
Prior to September 1999, all Australian firms seeking listing on the ASX were required to 
have either a history of profitability8 or net tangible assets of at least $2 million, with no more 
than half of total assets in cash (or in a form readily convertible to cash). If the firm held 
more than fifty percent of total assets in cash, it had to have binding contracts in place to 
reduce the balance to less than half (former LR 1.3.2(b)).  As the profitability, assets and 
binding contracts tests precluded many new economy firms from listing, the ASX replaced 
the ‘binding contracts’ requirement with a ‘commitments test’. From September 1999 firms 
which do not have a history of profitability and have cash holdings of more than fifty percent 
of total assets at listing date, are required to have commitments in place to spend the cash 
(and cash equivalents) in a way which is consistent with the firms’ business objectives (LR 
1.3.2(b)). “The change from binding contracts to commitments facilitated the admission of 
smaller entities with developing businesses based on new technology or other intellectual 
property assets” (ASX 2002, p.2).  
 
Although these ‘commitments test entities’ (CTEs) are listed on the ASX,9 they are not 
admitted on the same basis as other ASX-listed companies. CTEs are subject to the same 
general periodic reporting and disclosure rules, but in addition, are required to make a 
statement in the two annual financial reports following listing regarding whether they used 
the cash available at listing in a manner consistent with their business objectives (LR4.10.19). 
More onerously, CTEs are required under LR 4.7B to lodge quarterly cash flow (QCF) 
reports for at least two years10 after listing because less frequent reporting is considered 
inadequate in meeting the market’s information needs about such entities (ASX 2002). The 
ASX (2002, p.2) “considered that there are similarities between the position of a mining 
exploration entity and an entity admitted on the basis of a developing business” and 
accordingly, for both types of entities, “information in relation to expenditures, and cash flow 
generally, assists the market to understand the extent to which the entity is achieving its 
goals.”11 The requirement for CTEs to report quarterly cash flows suggests the ASX 
considers the nature of risks associated with such entities is similar to mining exploration 
companies, and different from all other ASX-listed entities.  
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2.3 ASIC/ASX Joint Continuous Disclosure Surveillance Program 
The introduction of ASX Listing Rule 4.7B coincides with the launch of the ASIC/ASX joint 
continuous disclosure surveillance program.12 Continuous disclosure provisions are contained 
in the ASX Listing Rules and the Corporations Act. Principle 5 of the ASX Rules states that 
“timely disclosure must be made of information which may affect security values or 
influence investment decisions, and information in which security holders, investors and 
ASX have a legitimate interest”. Furthermore, ASX Listing Rule 3.1 states that “once an 
entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would 
expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities, the entity must 
immediately tell ASX that information.” Listing Rule 3.1A provides exceptions to Listing 
Rule 3.1.13  Chapter 6CA14 of the Corporations Act provides statutory backing to ASX 
Listing Rule 3.1. A contravention of the LR 3.1 is also a contravention of s674 (2) of the 
Corporations Act, which may give rise to both criminal and civil penalties.  
 
In its media release on 1 February 2000, ASIC emphasised that, “because the surveillance 
program will target companies in market sectors with high trading volatility, it will inevitably 
focus on small mining and high technology companies”. Based on the results of Gallery, 
Gallery and Sidhu (2004), 62.3% of CTE reporting firms fit into this definition. Most CTE 
reporting firms are also small-sized and have negative recurring operating cash flows (and 
thus are loss making), making them obvious targets for the joint surveillance program.  
 
The ASX’s and ASIC’s concerns about CTE firms would appear to be justified, given that 
Klein and Mohanram (2005) find US IPO firms entering the market during the high-tech 
bubble exhibited significantly greater return volatility and performed substantially worse both 
in terms of financial performance, stock return performance as well as involuntary delisting, 
compared to firms that listed under the profitability standard. Consistent with these US 
findings, Gallery et al. (2004) report that in Australia the success rate of CTE firms has been 
very low, with more than 70% of these firms failing to achieve positive operating cash flows, 
leading to a continuation of quarterly cash flow reporting for more than eight quarters.  
 
In September 2001, the ASX issued amendments to Listing Rule 3.1 relating to continuous 
disclosure requirements, and reissued the associated Guidance Note 8. The changes again 
demonstrate the additional emphasis on the need for companies to keep the market fully 
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informed. Among the amendments are requirements for companies to respond to media 
comments or market speculation when they are not reflective of the company’s own 
expectations. Guidance Note 8 specifically suggests that a company must make immediate 
disclosure to the market when it becomes aware that actual revenues and profits will 
materially differ from the financial results for the previous corresponding period, or forecast 
projections contained in any prospectus, or projections and indications previously provided to 
the market in relation to the financial period, or consensus estimates made by analysts. 
 
In summary, Australian corporate fundraising and continuous disclosure regulations and their 
level of enforcement have undergone major changes since 2000. These changes are expected 
to have improved the practices of Australian firms with regard to fundraising and continuous 
disclosure through significant increases in the level of prospectus stop orders, tighter 
guidelines for disclosing earnings forecasts in prospectuses, higher levels of scrutiny placed 
on CTE firms, clarification of Listing Rule 3.1, and increases in sanctions for continuous 
disclosure contraventions, including the introduction of criminal penalties and ASIC’s on-
the-spot fines. 
 
3. Prior research and hypotheses development 
It is well established that managers weigh the costs against the benefits in deciding whether 
to voluntarily disclose information to the market (Verrecchia 1983). When seeking external 
capital, firms have strong incentives to increase their level of voluntary disclosure to reduce 
their cost of capital (Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Lang and Lundholm 2000).  However, 
potential litigation and/or reputation costs arising from inaccurate disclosure to investors can 
deter managers from providing detailed forward-looking disclosures in prospectus documents 
and accompanying announcements. In the U.S., securities laws and the threat of private 
litigation have traditionally discouraged the inclusion of earnings forecasts and other 
forward-looking information in prospectus documents (Hazen 1996). In contrast, outside the 
U.S., where litigation risk is significantly lower, earnings forecasts are frequently provided in 
fundraising documents. The lower level of litigation risk also appears to lead to an increase in 
earnings forecast revisions which are less biased towards bad news.15  
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3.1 Frequency of Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses 
Consistent with a lower litigation environment, early Australian IPO research reveals that 
earnings forecasts were disclosed in approximately 75 to 85 % of IPO prospectuses (Cheung, 
Lee, and Taylor 2000; How and Yeo 2001). However, the study by Chapple et al. (2005) 
reports that the proportion of IPO prospectuses disclosing earnings forecasts has declined 
considerably from 79% in the period of 1998-2000 to 59% in 2000-2002. Chapple et al. 
(2005, p. 69) attribute this decline to “the reduction in the litigation risk associated with 
initial public offering prospectus disclosure” arising from changes introduced by the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) with respect to corporate 
fundraising activities. It could alternatively be argued that given the increase in regulatory 
enforcement post-CLERP Act, litigation risk is likely to have increased the costs of 
forecasting.16  
3.2 Prospectus Earnings Forecasts Accuracy (pre-CLERP Act)  
Prior to the introduction of the CLERP Act on13 March 2000, the lower level of litigation risk 
in Australia was evident in the lack of accuracy in prospectus forecasts and subsequent 
revisions. Lee, Taylor, Yee and Yee (1993) examine a sample of Australian industrial IPOs 
between 1976 and 1989 and report a median absolute forecast error of 42.5%. They propose 
that these errors may be attributable to a firm’s age, size, forecast interval17 and growth 
prospects. Of these, the forecasting interval is found to be significantly and positively related 
to forecast error. Extending the findings of Lee et al. (1993), Hartnett and Romcke (2000) 
investigate 134 IPO firms from 1991 to 1996 and find that IPO prospectuses still have large 
forecast errors, with only 40% of forecasts falling within 10% of the actual earnings result. 
They report strong associations between forecast error and float motive, audit quality, and 
unanticipated industry activity. In a later study, Gallery, Gallery, and Ryan (2002) report an 
improved median absolute forecast error of 32.6% when examining 110 IPO prospectuses 
from 1994 to 1997. However, Chapple et al. (2005), who investigate 214 IPO prospectuses 
from 1998 to 2002, find that the median absolute forecast error has increased to 38.1% 
relative to prior studies, but not over their study period. Forecast error is found to be 
positively associated with forecast horizon and firms with higher growth prospects, and 
negatively associated with firm size, auditor quality, and the employment of an underwriter to 
the IPO. 
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3.3 Prospectus Earnings Forecasts Accuracy (post-CLERP Act)  
Chapple et al. (2005) argue that the CLERP Act has effectively reduced litigation risk by 
giving issuers a clearer sense of their potential legal liability with regard to prospectus 
forecasts, and by reducing ASIC’s scrutiny of prospectuses. However, as previously 
discussed, ASIC indicated that following enactment of the CLERP Act it would increase its 
prospectuses surveillance and “significantly increase” the frequency of stop orders (ASIC 
2000). Under s739 of the Corporations Act (and the old Corporations Law), ASIC has the 
power to issue interim or final stop orders when it finds defects in prospectuses. Both forms 
of stop orders are likely to be costly to new issuers. Interim stop orders are temporary 
suspensions that prevent the company from issuing further securities until they release a 
supplementary prospectus to correct the initial defects, whereas final stop orders are issued 
when the company fails to provide a supplementary prospectus. A final stop order means the 
capital raising is terminated indefinitely.  
 
Importantly, problems relating to financial forecasts and their assumptions have been the 
most common reason for stop orders. Figure 1 shows the trend in stop orders issued by ASIC 
over the period 1998 to 2003.  The high frequencies of prospectuses issued in 1999 and 2000 
reflect the ‘dot com’ boom and the introduction of CTEs by ASX Listing Rule 4.10.19. The 
graph clearly shows that the number of stop orders (as a proportion of the total number of 
prospectuses issued per year) increased sharply after the year 2000 (as foreshadowed by 
ASIC), indicating a dramatic increase in the scrutiny of prospectuses by ASIC. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
 
Subsequent to the enactment of the CLERP Act, the associated regulatory changes and 
increases in surveillance and enforcement action are expected to have increased the cost of 
providing misleading forecasts, resulting in a positive impact on the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts contained in IPO prospectuses. ASIC’s Information Memorandum IR01/05 
especially tightens the grounds for establishing a reasonable basis on which IPO firms make 
financial forecasts in prospectuses. Given these tighter guidelines and the increased 
surveillance and enforcement activities by ASIC and the ASX (particularly with respect to 
CTE firms), an expected outcome is a reduction in the number of prospectuses containing 
forecasts, and where they are provided, an increase in their accuracy (a reduction in error and 
bias). Hence the following are hypothesised: 
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H1a: The accuracy of IPO prospectus earnings forecasts increased subsequent to the 
implementation of the CLERP Act on 13 March 2000.  
H1b: The accuracy of IPO prospectus earnings forecasts increased more for CTE 
issuers than for non-CTE IPO issuers subsequent to the implementation of the CLERP 
Act on 13 March 2000. 
3.4 Accuracy of Prospectus Forecast Corrections 
Similar to prospectus earnings forecasts, the accuracy of the forecast revisions are also 
expected to improve along with the increases in the enforcement of the continuous disclosure 
regulations. In Australia’s continuous disclosure environment an IPO firm has an 
unambiguous obligation to update a prospectus forecast as the probability of achieving the 
forecast becomes less likely (Gallery, Gallery and Ryan 2002). Full compliance may require 
the firm to release a number of pre-earnings announcement updates to the ASX as earnings 
certainty increase. Where more than one prospectus forecast update is issued in the forecast 
horizon subsequent to listing, the last forecast (the ‘final prospectus forecast update’) issued 
by the firm would be expected to be more accurate in the post-CLERP Act period given the 
increased level of regulatory enforcement in that later period. In particular, the greater 
uncertainly faced by CTE firms is expected to have led to a greater increase in update 
forecast accuracy for these firms than for non-CTE firms. These arguments lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
H2a: The accuracy of final prospectus forecast revisions increased subsequent to the 
implementation of the CLERP Act on 13 March 2000. 
H2b: The accuracy of final prospectus forecast revisions increased more for CTE 
issuers than for non-CTE IPO issuers subsequent to the implementation of the CLERP 
Act on 13 March 2000. 
 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Sample and Data Sources  
The sample comprises all IPO firms listed on the ASX from 1998 to 2003 which have 
earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Prospectuses are sourced from the Connect4 New 
Issues database. Only those issues that can be clearly identified as new listings and having the 
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necessary earnings forecast and accounting data are included in the sample. The sample 
selection procedure resulted in a sample of 285 IPO firms and is summarised in Table 2, 
Panel A. Panel B shows sample firms categorised by year and whether they are CTE or non-
CTE firms; noticeably 40% of the sample are CTE firms.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here]  
 
Table 3 shows sample firms by industry categories and whether the IPO was lodged before or 
after the implementation of the CLERP Act (13 March 2000). Industry membership has been 
found to affect a firm’s earnings disclosure behaviour (Kasznik and Lev 1995). In Australian 
studies, Gallery, Gallery and Gilchrist (2003) and Gallery, Gallery and Ryan (2002) find that 
firms in the mining, energy and utilities, banking and finance, investment and financial 
services, and property trust industry categories (i.e., more regulated industries) are less likely 
to provide pre-emptive disclosures than firms in other industry groups. Hence for the 
purposes of the analysis, these firms are categorised as a regulated industry group, and the 
remaining firms are a non-regulated industry group.18 Table 3 shows that 25% of firms are in 
the regulated industry category, although there is wide dispersion across individual industries. 
Collectively, the ‘new economy’ industries (telecommunications; pharmaceuticals, healthcare 
and biotechnology; and technology hardware, software and services) account for 35% of the 
sample IPOs. This is primarily due to the inclusion of CTE firms from 1999 onwards. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
 
A number of firms issue forecasts for more than one financial year; for example, a firm 
lodging an IPO prospectus at the beginning of 2000 may have earnings forecast for the 
periods ending June 2000 and June 2001. These forecasts are defined as the first year forecast 
and the second year forecast respectively. Table 4 shows that sample firms have a minimum 
forecast year of one and a maximum of three. Altogether, the sample yields a total of 460 
firm-year forecasts over the study period; 285 IPO firms included earnings forecasts for only 
the first reporting year, 154 firms disclosed forecasts for two reporting years, and 21 firms 
disclosed forecasts for three reporting years.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
 
 12
Prospectus earnings forecast updates were identified and collected through a systematic 
examination of the ASX announcements for each firm for the periods covered by the 
prospectus forecasts. ASX announcements were sourced from SIRCA and Aspect/Huntley 
Financial Signal G databases. Market capitalisation data were obtained from the Share Price 
and Price Relatives (SPPR) database.19  The remaining non-prospectus data were sourced 
either directly from the Connect4 Annual Report or the Aspect/Huntley DatAnalysis 
databases. 
4.2 Identification and Classification of Final Prospectus Forecast Revisions 
A careful examination of the ASX announcements made by each firm, for each of the 
forecast period, resulted in a total of 445 disclosures that update (confirm or correct) the 
prospectus earnings forecasts subsequent to listing and during the forecast horizon. As 
illustrated in Table 5, 185 first-year prospectus forecasts updates were released from the 
sample of 285 firms, whereas 241 second-year forecasts were released from the sample of 
154 firms, and 19 third-year forecasts released from 21 sample firms. The lower proportion of 
first-year updates may be explained by the fact that the average forecast horizon for the first 
year forecasts is considerably shorter than in later years.20 
 
[Insert Table 5 here]  
 
All of the 445 prospectus earnings forecast updates are coded according to the nature of the 
news disclosed in the forecast. Good news refers to updates that are made to confirm or 
correct the prospectus earnings forecast upwards, whereas bad news refers to updates that 
correct the prospectus forecast downwards. Only the final forecast revisions in a horizon 
period are used to test H2. Where no revision is provided subsequent to listing, the prospectus 
forecast is used as the final forecast.  
4.3 Hypothesis Testing Procedures  
Following prior research, two measures are used to test H1 (the hypothesised increase in 
prospectus forecast accuracy). Prospectus forecast error bias (PFE) is the relative directional 
prospectus earnings forecast error, and is calculated as follows:21 
PFE = (Forecasted Earnings – Actual Earnings) 
       | Forecasted Earnings |  
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Prospectus forecast error size (PFESIZE), the absolute value of PFE, measures the magnitude 
of the prospectus earnings forecast error. OLS regression Model 1 is estimated to test H1a 
and H1b.  
 
PFEit (or PFESIZEit) = α + β1REGYEARit + β2CTEit + β3LNMCAPit + + β4REGINDit + 
β5GROWTHit + β6SEOit + β7RET_OWNit + β8PYRSEARNit + β9P_HORit +  
β10UWRITERit + β11AUDITORit + β12AUDCOMit + β13CHAIRit + β14INDIRit  + εit      
 (1) 
 
REGYEAR is the first test variable testing whether the changes in regulation and increases in 
enforcement in the post-CLERP Act period had an impact on the properties of prospectus 
earnings forecasts (H1a). Accordingly, REGYEAR is a binary variable coded 1 if the 
prospectus was lodged on or after 13 March 2000, and 0 otherwise. CTE is the second test 
variable testing the impact of the CTE categorisation on IPO forecasting behaviour (to test 
H1b). It is a binary variable coded 1 for firms that were admitted to the ASX under the 
commitments test entity category and 0 otherwise. A significantly negative β1 coefficient and 
a significantly positive β2 coefficient are predicted in accordance with H1a and H1b. 
The remaining variables entering Model 1 are controls for other factors that are expected to 
be associated with the dependent variable.  Larger firms have consistently been observed to 
make more frequent earnings forecast disclosures (Kent and Ung 1997; Brown et al. 1999; 
Gallery, Gallery and Gilchrist 2003), and to be associated with various properties of earnings 
forecast disclosures (Baginski and Hassell 1997). Firm size is measured by the natural log of 
market capitalisation (LNMCAP) at the IPO issue date. Firm size is argued to have a negative 
relation with forecast error as larger firms have greater capacity to absorb the impact of 
unexpected events, more diverse operations, and more sophisticated forecasting techniques 
(Chapple et al. 2005; Hartnett and Romcke 2000; Lee et al. 1993). The control variable for 
industry (REGIND) is coded 1 if the IPO firm is in the banking and finance, investment and 
financial services, property trust and mining industries, and 0 otherwise. Kasznik and Lev 
(1995) argue that firms in heavily regulated industries are already required to provide a 
substantial amount of detailed information to regulators and thus have less need to disclose 
further voluntary earnings information. The classification of regulated industry categories is 
based on Gallery, Gallery and Gilchrist (2003), who find that firms in the banking and 
finance, investment and financial services, property trust and mining industries are less 
predisposed to releasing earnings forecasts compared to firms in other industries.  
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Forecast error is expected to be positively related to a firm’s growth opportunities as a high 
growth firm may be subject to relatively greater fluctuations in earnings compared to a low 
growth firm (Chapple et al. 2005; Lee et al. 1993). GROWTH is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at the issue date. When an IPO firm plans to raise capital 
shortly after listing, it is more likely to disclose more accurate earnings forecasts in its IPO 
prospectus in order to send a positive signal to the market. For the same reason, the firm is 
also more likely to update the market if the prospectus forecast is not likely to be met. 
Earnings forecasts enhance the ability to attract new capital (Lees 1981) and suggest that 
capital offerings motivate forecast release (Ruland et al. 1990). SEO is a binary variable 
coded 1 if the firm launched a secondary equity offering during the forecast period and 0 
otherwise. 
Chapple et al. (2005) argue that the level of retained ownership should be negatively 
associated with forecast frequency as higher levels of retained ownership reduce the need to 
signal a firm’s quality through disclosure to the market. RET_OWN is the proportion of 
firms’ shares held by pre-existing owners after listing. PYRSEARN represents the number of 
prior year earnings disclosed in the prospectus. Earnings volatility is argued to have a 
negative association with forecast accuracy, frequency, and precision (Waymire 1985; 
Baginski et al 2002). Following Gallery, Gallery and Ryan (2002), the disclosure of prior 
years’ earnings is employed as a proxy for the firm’s level of earnings volatility. Since little 
information on an IPO firm is publicly available prior to listing, the disclosure of a steady 
stream of earnings reduces the perceived riskiness of the firm. On the other hand, highly 
volatile prior earnings will magnify the risk associated with the IPO. Therefore, firms with 
less volatile historical earnings are more likely to disclose them in their IPO prospectuses.  
P_HOR represents the horizon of an earnings forecast and is measured as the number of days 
from the release of the prospectus forecast to the actual earnings announcement date. Horizon 
is likely to be positively related to forecast error as firms making longer-term forecasts face 
greater uncertainties in both the internal and external environments of the firm, thereby 
reducing the accuracy of the forecast (Lee et al. 1993; Baginski et al. 2002). For the same 
reason, Baginski et al. (2002) find that longer-horizon forecasts tend to be less precise than 
shorter-horizon forecasts. UWRITER is coded 1 if the IPO was underwritten and 0 otherwise. 
The involvement of an underwriter in the IPO process is expected to reduce forecast error 
(Chapple et al. 2005) as the underwriter performs a monitoring role, encouraging the issuer to 
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forecast accurately in order to maintain the underwriter’s reputation. AUDITOR is coded 1 if 
the IPO firm employed a Big-N auditor and 0 otherwise. Clarkson (2000) argues that the 
employment of a high quality auditor also increases the accuracy of a firm’s earnings 
forecasts. Supporting evidence is provided in Hartnett and Romcke (2000).  
The increasing focus on corporate governance is evident in Australia through the forming of 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council in August 2002, and the release of the ASX 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in March 
2003. As adoption of the governance principles may impact on disclosure behaviour during 
our study period, governance control variables are included in our model to control for three 
key governance recommendations contained in those principles: AUDCOM, INDIR and 
CHAIR.22  
AUDCOM is coded 0 if no audit committee exist, 1 if the committee is made up of both 
executive and non-executive directors, and 2 if the committee consists entirely of non-
executive directors. It is expected that firms would have had an increasingly independent 
audit committee over the study period in the face of increasing public and regulatory 
pressure. From 1 January 2003, ASX Listing Rule 12.7 requires all listed firms to have an 
audit committee composed entirely of non-executive directors. In a U.S. study, Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) find that effective audit committees are positively associated with earnings 
forecast disclosures, which are more accurate (but less precise). INDIR represents the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Again, in the face of increasing public 
and regulatory pressure on corporate governance practices, the boards of the sample firms are 
expected to be increasingly independent over the study period. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
and Ajinkya et al. (2005) find a positive association between this proxy and the frequency of 
management earnings forecasts. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) also find the proportion of 
outside directors on a board is positively related to greater forecast accuracy, yet negatively 
related to forecast precision. CHAIR is coded 0 if a firm’s Chief Executive Officer is also its 
chairman, 1 if the chairman is an executive, and 2 if the chairman is a non-executive director. 
This variable is employed as another proxy for board independence in conjunction with the 
INDIR proxy. Furthermore, the chairman’s address is one of the most common sources of 
earnings forecast disclosures; hence the chairman’s degree of independence may affect the 
quality of such disclosures. 
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Model 2 is estimated to test the H2a and H2b prediction of increased accuracy in final 
prospectus forecast revisions.  FINALFE is the final forecast error bias or the relative 
directional error, based on the expected earnings figure given in the last prospectus forecast 
update issued during the forecast horizon. FINALFE is calculated in the same way as PFE, 
but with the ‘forecasted earnings’ measured using the final forecast update for the period (or 
using the prospectus forecast if no update is provided in the forecast horizon period 
subsequent to listing). FINALFE SIZE is the magnitude of the final forecast error and is 
measured by the absolute value of FINALFE.    
 
FINAL FEit (or FINALFE_SIZEit) = α +γ1REGYEARit + γ2CTEit + γ3LNMCAPit +  
 γ4REGINDit + γ5GROWTHit  + γ6SEOit + γ7RET_OWNit + γ8PYRSEARNit +
 γ9F_HORit + γ10NEWSit + γ11UFC_TOTit + γ12AUDITORit + γ13AUDCOMit + 
 γ14CHAIRit + γ15INDIRit + εit      
(2) 
 
A negative and significant γ1 coefficient would provide support for the H2a prediction that the 
final prospectus forecast updates are more accurate in the post-CLERP Act period than pre-
CLERP Act. A significantly positive γ2 coefficient would provide support for the H2b 
prediction that the accuracy of final prospectus forecast updates is greater for CTE firms than 
non-CTE firms.  
The control variables in Model 2 are the same as in Model 123, except for the additional 
variables NEWS and UFC_TOT, and F_HOR replacing P_HOR.  NEWS is coded 1 if actual 
earnings meet or exceed the final prospectus forecast (good news outcome), and 0 otherwise 
(bad news outcome). Skinner (1994) finds that voluntary management earnings forecasts are 
more likely to occur during bad news periods (with large negative earnings surprises) and 
attribute this to the reduction in reputation and litigation costs resulting from the voluntary 
release of bad earnings news. Gallery, Gallery and Ryan (2002) also find that bad news 
periods are more likely to be pre-empted by correctional disclosures when compared with 
good news periods. UFC_TOT captures the number of prospectus forecast revisions issued by 
the firm subsequent to listing and before the earnings realisation date of the related forecast. 
Firms providing more forecast updates are likely to be motivated to produce more accurate 
forecasts. F_HOR is the number of days from the release of the forecast update to the actual 
earnings announcement date.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used to test 
prospectus and final forecast accuracy. The mean and median prospectus forecast bias (PFE) 
are 267.9% and 8.1% respectively, and the mean and median prospectus forecast error 
(PFE_SIZE) are 296.7% and 39.4% respectively. Hence, consistent with prior literature, the 
overall sample exhibits a significant positive bias, indicating that management are over-
optimistic in the preparation of prospectus earnings forecasts. The mean and median final 
forecast bias (FINALFE) are 15.6% and 1.2% respectively, and the mean and median 
prospectus forecast error size (FINALFE SIZE) are 37.5% and 8.1% respectively.  These 
figures show that the forecast accuracy improves significantly after management issues 
revisions to correct inaccurate prospectus forecasts.   
   
[Insert Table 6 here]  
 
Table 6 Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables entering the 
regression models. A number of changes across the sub-periods are evident. The median total 
number of prospectus forecast updates (UFC_TOT) issued by firms increased from an 
average of just under 1 (0.813) update per forecast period in the pre-CLERP Act period to just 
over 1 (1.063) post-CLERP Act. Untabulated results show that the proportion of IPO firms 
issuing updates to correct their prospectus forecasts has increased from 34% to 38% (this 
change is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level). Managers seem to be more inclined to 
make corrections in the post-CLERP Act period; a behaviour that may be attributable to 
tighter regulations and the increasingly litigious environment.  
 
Consistent with Chapple et al. (2005), existing owners tend to retain a large proportion of the 
firm’s equity (RET_OWN), with retained ownership increasing from 51% pre-CLERP Act to 
64% post-CLERP Act. Independence of audit committees (AUDCOM) also increased in the 
post-CLERP Act period with most firms having audit committees that are partly comprised of 
executive directors pre-CLERP Act, while post-CLERP Act, the majority of sample IPO firms 
had audit committees composed of all non-executive directors.  This is in line with the 
increasing scrutiny placed on corporate governance structures in the post-CLERP Act period. 
The proportion of firms in regulated industries (REGIND) almost doubled in the post-period 
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due primarily to new firms entering the banking and finance industry (as shown in Table 3). 
Furthermore, post-CLERP Act, fewer IPO firms had secondary equity offerings (SEO) and 
fewer engaged a Big-N auditor (AUDITOR). 
 
 
From a regulatory perspective, inaccuracies in earnings forecasts contained in prospectuses 
would generally be problematic only for material forecast errors. We therefore conduct 
analyses on the extent to which the prospectus forecast errors are material, whether the 
frequencies of material errors differed in the pre- and post-CLERP Act periods, and the extent 
to which material forecast errors were subsequently updated, using a materiality threshold of 
10%. Table 7, Panel A shows that 69%-74% of IPO firms make material prospectus forecast 
errors and that CTE firms issues a significantly greater proportion of materially inaccurate 
prospectus forecasts (83%-84%) compared to non-CTE firms (60%-66%). However, there is 
no evidence of a significant change in material forecast errors across the two sub-periods for 
either IPO group. Consistent with Table 6, final forecasts are considerably more accurate than 
the prospectus forecasts, though around half of the firm years still had material forecast 
errors.  
   
[Insert Table 7 here]  
 
An interesting finding is that the proportion of firms with material final forecast inaccuracies 
decreased significantly for CTE firms in the post-CLERP Act period (from  62% to 46%), 
while no changes are observed for the non-CTE firms. This result suggests that the regulatory 
changes and increases in enforcement may have been more effective for CTE firms compared 
to non-CTE firms. For the firm years where prospectus forecasts turn out to be materially 
inaccurate, Panel B presents managers’ updating behaviour during the forecast period; that is, 
whether managers issued an update to correct the inaccurate prospectus forecast, issued no 
update at all, or worse, falsely informed the market that the prospectus forecast will be met.  
The lack of statistical significance between sub-periods in Panel B indicates similar updating 
behaviour in the pre- and post-CLERP Act periods. Only around 44% of firms (47% and 41% 
of CTE and non-CTE firms respectively) issued updates to correct materially inaccurate 
prospectus forecasts, while 41% of firms (44% and 39% CTE and non-CTE) issued no update 
during the forecast period. Interestingly, approximately 15% of firms issued updates to assure 
the market that their prospectus forecast will be met when they actually turn out to be 
materially inaccurate. This figure is even higher for non-CTE firms (20%). The fact that the 
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proportion of firms issuing false confirmations has not decreased significantly in the post-
CLERP Act period suggests a need for regulatory attention to this matter by ASIC and ASX.  
5.2 Regression Results 
5.2.1 Correlation Tests 
Prior to conducting tests of the regression models the correlation matrix for the independent 
variables entering the regression models was examined. As shown in Table 8, the correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables are within acceptable levels, indicating that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to pose a problem for interpretation of coefficients in the 
regression analysis.  
   
[Insert Table 8 here]  
 
 
5.2.2 Prospectus Forecast Accuracy (H1) 
Table 9 presents regression test results for Model 1. Panels A and Panel B display the results 
of prospectus forecast error bias and size respectively. H1a predicts that the accuracy of IPOs 
prospectus earnings forecasts is greater in the post-CLERP Act period compared to the pre-
CLERP Act period. Consistent with this expectation, the REGYEAR coefficient is 
significantly negative for all IPO firms. Analysis of the CTE/non-CTE sub-samples shows 
that this result is driven by CTE firms. Thus, as predicted in H1b, the changes in regulation 
post-CLERP Act have been effective in reducing prospectus forecast error for CTE firms but 
not for non-CTE firms. This finding shows that the regulatory and enforcement changes in 
the post-CLERP Act period have been effective in reducing information risk associated with 
investing in these smaller, riskier (CTE) firms by improving the accuracy of their prospectus 
forecasts. 
   
[Insert Table 9 here]  
 
Further evident in Table 9 are the results for the control variables. The variables LNMCAP, 
P_HOR, and REGIND are all significant in the expected directions, consistent with prior IPO 
studies (Lee et al. 1993; Gallery, Gallery and Ryan 2002; Chapple et al. 2005). SEO is 
negatively related to prospectus forecast error, consistent with the expectation that IPO firms 
looking to raise additional funds shortly after listing will make more accurate prospectus 
forecast in order to build the market’s confidence and reduce the costs of capital in the 
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secondary equity offering market. In contrast to Chapple et al. (2005), the existence of an IPO 
underwriter is found to be positively associated with prospectus forecast error bias and size 
(although this is driven by the CTE sub-sample).  Also contrary to expectations, the presence 
of a more independent chairman (CHAIR) (for the CTE sub-sample) and a greater proportion 
of non-executive directors on a board (for the non-CTE sub-sample) are associated with 
greater prospectus forecast errors.24  
5.2.3 Final Forecast Accuracy (H2) 
Table 10 reports results of tests of H2a which predicts that the accuracy of the final 
prospectus forecasts is greater in the post-CLERP Act period compared to the pre-CLERP Act 
period, and H2b which predicts that CTE firms final forecast revisions are more accurate than 
non-CTE firms over these two periods. Panels A and Panel B display the results of final 
forecast error bias and size respectively. H2a is supported as the REGYEAR coefficient is 
again negative and significant in both Panels. Like the prospectus forecast error, this result is 
driven by CTE firms as predicted in H2b. This result is not surprising as the significant 
improvement in the prospectus forecast accuracy of CTE firms in the post-CLERP Act period, 
accompanied by increases in correctional disclosures, are bound to result in a significant 
improvement in the final forecast accuracy (as it involves a combination of the two factors).  
   
[Insert Table 10 here]  
 
Other significant findings reveal that the UFC_TOT coefficient is significant and negative, 
suggesting that the number of updates issued during the forecast period is negatively related 
to the final forecast error. This is consistent with expectation since the more revisions a firm 
makes; the more likely they will be accurate, especially towards the end of the period. Actual 
earnings outcomes that exceed forecasts (i.e. where NEWS = 1) tend to be associated with 
more accurate forecasts than those that fall short of forecasts and this appears to be driven by 
non-CTE firms. Contrary to expectation, the significantly positive SEO coefficient suggests 
that non-CTE firms that issue secondary equity offerings during the forecast period are likely 
to have greater forecast errors.   
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
Several sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to various 
conditions and alternate specifications of variable constructs. First, the models are tested with 
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the industry variable, REGIND, divided into five industry categories: mining, finance, 
technology, engineering, and consumer industry groups (with the first four included as 
dummy variables). Consistent with Chapple et al. (2005), dividing firms into the five industry 
categories does not change the results of the hypothesis tests, but it takes away the 
significance of the industry variable (as none of the four dummy variables are significant in 
any of the regressions). 
  
Second, to control for the fact that some firms have more than one year’s forecast in the 
sample (e.g. some firms provide a forecast for the second and third year) the regressions are 
estimated only for data corresponding to the first forecast year. Moreover, a control variable 
is added to each model to control for such firms (1 if the firm has more a one-year forecast in 
the prospectus and 0 otherwise).  The results obtained from these tests do not reveal any 
significant differences to the main findings previously reported. Third, the robustness of the 
results to events unique to a particular year is examined by adding year dummy variables 
(representing each of the years 1999-2003) to the regressions. The results do not reveal any 
significant differences to the main findings. 
 
Fourth, the results of the regressions after eliminating firm years with prospectus forecast 
horizon of 30 days or less (10 forecasts in total) and those with final forecast horizon of 30 
days or less (17 forecasts in total) from the sample, consistent with Lee et al. (1993). The 
results from this analysis also reveal no significant differences to the main results. Fifth, a 
dummy variable is created to distinguish between projections and forecasts as PS 170 
requires forecasts to be disclosed only if they are based on reasonable grounds. Projections 
are based on hypothetical assumptions and not reasonable grounds, thus PS170 (effective 
September 2002) does not allow for their inclusion whereas the older PN67 does. Therefore, 
this variable is included in testing for the accuracy of prospectus forecasts. Surprisingly, it is 
not significant and does not alter the results, other than slightly decreasing the adjusted R2. 
Finally, adding a proxy for board size (total number of directors on the board) to each model 
also does not yield any material differences and actually decreased the adjusted R2 of some 
models. 
 
Taken together, the sensitivity tests support the main findings which indicate that regulatory 
changes and increased enforcement in the post-CLERP Act period have effectively improved 
the prospectus forecast accuracy (H1), and the accuracy of the final forecast (H2). An 
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important finding is that results for all tests of the regression models demonstrate significant 
differences in the forecasting behaviour of CTE firms compared to non-CTE firms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of reforms to the Australian corporate fundraising rules and 
relaxation of ASX listing rules on the earnings forecast disclosures of Australian IPO firms. 
In particular, this study investigates whether, in the post-CLERP Act period, regulatory 
changes and enforcement action have improved IPO firms’ practices in terms of the accuracy 
of prospectus earnings forecasts and subsequent forecasts revisions prior to the earnings 
realisations. 
 
A review of the Australian corporate fundraising and continuous disclosure regulations in 
section 2 shows that significant changes occurred starting from the year 2000, including 
significant increases in the level of prospectus stop orders issued by ASIC, the tighter 
guidelines for disclosing earnings forecasts in prospectuses, and increases in sanctions for 
continuous disclosure contraventions brought about by the various stages of the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program. The nature of firms listing on the ASX also changed with 
the admission of commitments test entities (CTEs) to the ASX. Furthermore, because CTEs 
are primarily high risk companies, the ASX requires additional disclosure from CTEs and 
other similar high risk entities in the form of compulsory quarterly cash flow reports. 
 
Our study extends the Chapple et al. (2005) findings in that we re-examine the IPO 
forecasting behaviour over a similar time period (extended by one year), but control for the 
important and significant change in the types of firms newly listing on the ASX – CTE firms. 
Like Chapple et al. we expect that IPO forecasting frequency has declined in the post-CLERP 
Act but we expect the quality of forecasting (as measured by forecast accuracy) to have 
improved in the later time period after controlling for CTE firms. Furthermore, we expect that 
CTE firms are the main contributors to the changing forecasting behaviour due to their closer 
scrutiny by the ASX and ASIC. In contrast to Chapple et al., our expectations are premised 
on an increase in regulatory enforcement over the post-CLERP Act period leading to an 
increase in litigation risk rather than a decrease in litigation risk as argued by Chapple et al.  
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Consistent with our expectations our results show that regulatory changes and increased 
enforcement in the post-CLERP Act period have been effective in improving the accuracy of 
prospectus earnings forecasts. Additionally we find a noticeable improvement in the accuracy 
of final forecast revisions prior to the actual earnings announcement date. Importantly, our 
results reveal that the observed improvement in forecasting behaviour is primarily driven by 
the CTE IPO firms rather than the traditional, non-CTE IPO firms. However, the finding that 
66% (84%) of non-CTE (CTE) IPO firms in the post-CLERP Act period continue to make 
significant material prospectus earnings forecast errors suggests the need for further 
regulatory scrutiny.  A major implication of our findings is the need to control for the 
distinctively different CTE firms when conducting Australian IPO and disclosure research in 
the post-CLERP Act period.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary of Australian Corporate Regulatory Changes: 1999-2004 
1 September 1999 ASX Listing Rule 1.3.2(b) changes asset test from ‘binding contracts’ to ‘commitments’ for firms with more than 50% of assets in cash at listing date.  
1 November 1999 ASIC releases Draft Guidance - Heard it on the Grapevine to raise awareness about continuous disclosure obligations. 
1 February 2000 ASIC/ASX joint national continuous disclosure surveillance program is launched. 
18 February 2000 ASIC responds to the CLERP Act amendments with the following comment: “we will significantly increase the frequency with which we issue stop orders". 
13 March 2000 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act 1999 (Cth) is enacted. 
31 March 2000 
ASX Listing Rule 4.7B(a) requires firms newly listing on the ASX under LR 
1.3.2(b) (Commitments Test Entities) to lodge quarterly cash flow reports in the 
Appendix 4C format.  
7 February 2001 ASIC Information Memorandum (IR 01/05) advises tighter guidelines governing financial forecasts and projections in prospectuses. 
15 July 2001 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) replaces the Corporations Law, accompanied by the ASIC Act 2001. 
30 September 2001 ASX amends Listing Rule 3.1 and reissues Guidance Note 8 on continuous disclosure obligations. 
11 March 2002 The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 is enacted. 
6 September 2002 ASIC replaces Practice Note 67 (Financial Forecasts in Prospectuses) with Policy Statement 170 (Prospective Financial Information). 
1 July 2004 The enactment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9). 
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Table 2 
Sample Firms 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
Initial sample of prospectus identified from Connect4 Database 1998-2003 846 
Less Rights and Entitlements (Non-IPOs) and  
IPOs subsequently withdrawn (305) 
Less IPO prospectuses with no quantitative forecast data (252) 
Less IPO firms that are delisted before the first forecast is realized (2) 
Less IPO firms with missing data (2) 
Final Sample 285 
Panel B: Distribution of CTE firms in the sample 
Year25 CTE Firms % Non-CTE Firms % 
1998 1 3% 32 97% 
1999 39 51% 37 49% 
2000 57 55% 46 45% 
2001 7 37% 12 63% 
2002 7 32% 15 68% 
2003 4 13% 28 88% 
Total 115 40% 170 60% 
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Table 3 
Industry Classification of IPO Firms 
GICS Industry Group All Pre-CLERP Act Post-CLERP Act 
 N % N % N % 
Regulated Industries       
Metals & Mining 8 3% 1 1% 7 4% 
Oil, Gas & Energy 5 2% 1 1% 4 2% 
Infrastructure & Utilities 12 4% 2 2% 10 6% 
Banks & Finance 26 9% 1 1% 25 14% 
Insurance 3 1% 1 1% 2 1% 
Property Trusts 17 6% 11 10% 6 3% 
Regulated Industries Subtotal 71 25% 17 16% 54 31% 
Non-Regulated Industries       
Developers & Contractors 7 2% 4 4% 3 2% 
Building Materials 1 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 21 7% 9 8% 12 7% 
Chemicals 1 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Paper & Forest Products 5 2% 1 1% 4 2% 
Retail & Consumer Services 32 11% 15 14% 17 10% 
Transportation 4 1% 2 2% 2 1% 
Media 17 6% 10 9% 7 4% 
Telecommunications 35 12% 17 16% 18 10% 
Commercial Services & Supplies 24 8% 8 7% 16 9% 
Pharmaceuticals, Healthcare & 
Biotechnology 18 6% 4 4% 14 8% 
Technology Hardware, Software & 
Services 49 17% 22 20% 27 15% 
Non-Regulated Industries Subtotal 214 75% 93 85% 121 69% 
Total 
 285 100% 109 100% 176 100% 
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Table 4 
IPO Firms with Earnings Forecasts 
Year 
Firms Total    Firm 
Years FY1 FY2 FY3 
1998 33 17 6 56 
1999 76 42 2 120 
Pre-CLERP Act  
subtotal 109 59 8 176 
2000 103 56 7 166 
2001 19 13 1 33 
2002 22 11 4 37 
2003 32 15 1 48 
Post-CLERP Act  
subtotal 176 95 13 284 
Total 285 154 21 460 
FY1 refers to the first year forecast, i.e. the first financial year for which an earnings 
forecast is made in the prospectus; FY2 and FY3 refer to the second and third year 
forecasts respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Frequency of Prospectus Forecast Revisions 
Year FY1 FY2 FY3 Total Updates 
1998 18 17 3 38 
1999 38 65 2 105 
Pre-CLERP Act  
subtotal 56 82 5 143 
2000 78 87 5 170 
2001 13 27 3 43 
2002 12 16 6 34 
2003 26 29 0 55 
Post-CLERP Act  
subtotal 129 159 14 302 
Total 185 241 19 445 
FY1 refers to the first year forecast, i.e. the first financial year for which an earnings 
forecast is made in the prospectus; FY2 and FY3 refer to the second and third year 
forecasts respectively. Updates refers to the total number of disclosures issued 
during the forecast horizon to confirm or correct the prospectus forecasts. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Overall sample     Pre-CLERP Act     Post-CLERP Act    
t-stat  (z-value)  Mean (Median) Mean (Median) Mean (Median) 
Panel A: Dependent Variables  (n=460) (n=176) (n=284) 
PFE (bias) 2.679 (0.081) 4.535 (0.058) 1.529 (0.088) 1.613 (-0.550) 
PFE SIZE (error) 2.967 (0.394) 4.716 (0.291) 1.883 (0.421) 1.523 (-0.758) 
FINALFE (bias) 0.156 (0.012) 0.071 (0.003) 0.200 (0.015) -0.467 (-1.418) 
FINALFE SIZE (error) 0.375 (0.081) 0.369 (0.101) 0.379 (0.066) -0.038 (-0.970) 
Panel B: Independent Variables  (n=285) (n=109) (n=176)  
MCAP ($ million) 231.4 (38.0) 354.9 (35.8) 154.9 (41.2) 1.065 (-0.484) 
LNMCAP 17.712 (17.454) 17.676 (17.392) 17.734 (17.534) -0.333 (-0.484) 
GROWTH 3.477 (2.230) 3.634 (2.007) 3.379 (2.251) 0.431 (-0.093) 
PYRSEARN (Years) 2.242 (2.000) 2.349 (2.000) 2.176 (2.000) 1.112 (-1.469) 
UFC_TOT 0.968 (1.000) 0.813 (1.000) 1.063 (1.000) -2.411** (-1.888)* 
P_HOR (Days) 218 (239) 229 (245) 210 (232) 1.238 (-0.064) 
F_HOR (Days) 189 (182) 196 (189) 186 (182) 1.025 (-1.538) 
RET_OWN 0.587 (0.641) 0.507 (0.561) 0.637 (0.678) -4.369*** (-4.577***) 
AUDCOM 1.295 (2.000) 1.156 (1.000) 1.381 (2.000) -2.241** (-2.098**) 
CHAIR 1.772 (2.000) 1.752 (2.000) 1.784 (2.000) -0.484 (-0.926) 
INDIR 0.602 (0.600) 0.585 (0.600) 0.612 (0.600) -1.126 (-1.176) 
REGIND 71  (25%) 17  (16%) 54  (31%)   8.189** 
CTE 115  (40%) 40  (37%) 75  (43%) 0.979 
SEO 91  (32%) 42  (39%) 49  (28%) 3.540* 
AUDITOR 176  (62%) 76  (70%) 100  (57%)   4.748** 
UWRITER 225  (79%) 89  (82%) 136  (77%) 0.776 
*,**,*** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively (2-tailed). Pre (Post)-CLERP Act includes prospectus lodgements 
dates up to (on/after) 13 March 2000; PFE is the prospectus forecast error bias or the relative directional forecast error, measured as 
the difference between forecasted earnings in the prospectus and the actual reported earnings, scaled by the absolute value of 
forecasted earnings; PFE SIZE is the prospectus forecast error size, measured as the absolute value of PFE; FINALFE is the final 
forecast error bias or the relative directional final earnings forecast error, based on the expected earnings figure given in the last update 
issued during the forecast period; FINALFE SIZE is the magnitude of the final earnings forecast error and is measured by the absolute 
value of FINALFE; MCAP is the value of market capitalisation at lodgement date and LNMCAP is its natural log; GROWTH is market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity at lodgement date; PYRSEARN is the number of prior year earnings disclosed in 
the prospectus;  UFC_TOT is the frequency of updates made during the forecast period and is measured by the number of disclosures 
issued during the forecast period to update (either to confirm or correct) the prospectus forecast; P_HOR is the number of days from 
the release of the prospectus forecast to the actual earnings announcement date; F_HOR is the number of days from the release of the 
forecast update to the actual earnings announcement date. RET_OWN is the proportion of shares held by pre-existing owners after 
listing; AUDCOM is coded 0 if no audit committee exists, 1 if the committee is made up of both executive and non-executive 
directors, or 2 if the committee consists entirely of non-executive directors; CHAIR is coded 0 if the chairman is also the firm’s CEO, 
1 if the chairman is an executive director other than the CEO, or 2 if the chairman is a non-executive director; INDIR is the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board; REGIND is coded 1 for firms in the investment and financial services, banking and finance, 
property trust and mining industries and 0 otherwise; CTE equals to 1 for Commitments Test Entities and 0 otherwise; SEO equals to 1 
for firms that launched a secondary equity offering during the forecast period and 0 otherwise; AUDITOR equals to 1 for firms with a 
Big-N auditor and 0 otherwise; UWRITER equals 1 for firms that employed an underwriter for the IPO and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 7 
Frequencies of Material Prospectus Forecast Errors and Subsequent Updating Behaviour 
    All                         CTE firms                  Non-CTE firms              
   
Pre-
CLERP 
Act         
Post-
CLERP 
Act       
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Pre-
CLERP 
Act       
Post-
CLERP 
Act       
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Pre-
CLERP 
Act        
Post-
CLERP 
Act       
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
Panel A: Firm-years with material prospectus forecast errors (errors > 10%) 
N 176 284   66 124   110 160   
Prospectus 
forecast 
(%) 
121 
(69%) 
210 
(74%) 
1.453 
 
55 
(83%) 
104 
(84%) 
0.009 
 
66 
(60%) 
106      
(66%) 
1.101 
 
Final forecast 
(%) 
88 
(50%) 
127 
(45%) 
1.218 
 
41 
(62%) 
57 
(46%) 
4.500** 
 
47 
(43%) 
70 
(44%) 
0.028 
 
              
Panel B: Subsequent updating behaviour for firm-years with material prospectus forecast errors 
N 121 210  55 104  66 106  
Corrections 
(%) 
45 
(37%) 
108 
(51%) 
0.023 
 
21 
(38%) 
59 
(57%) 
1.054 
 
24 
(36%) 
49 
(46%) 
0.069 
 
No update 
(%) 
56 
 (46%) 
77 
(37%) 
0.048 
 
27 
(49%) 
41 
(39%) 
0.017 
 
29 
(44%) 
36 
(34%) 
0.115 
 
False 
Confirmations 
(%) 
20 
(17%) 
25 
(12%) 
0.276 
 
7 
(13%) 
4 
(4%) 
0.748 
 
13 
(20%) 
21 
(20%) 
1.231 
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Table 8 Correlation Coefficients and p-Values for Independent Variables (Pearson above the diagonal; Spearman below the diagonal) 
  
    REGYEAR CTE LNMCAP REGIND GROWTH SEO 
RET_OW
N 
PYRSEA
RN P_HOR F_HOR NEWS UFC_TOT 
UWRITE
R AUDITOR AUDCOM CHAIR INDIR 
REGYEAR Coeff.   0.047 0.036 0.149 -0.038 -0.12 0.264 -0.073 -0.037 0.148 -0.089 0.107 -0.073 -0.16 0.144 0.036 0.085 
p-value   0.314 0.445 0.001 0.418 0.01 0 0.117 0.428 0.002 0.159 0.022 0.116 0.001 0.002 0.447 0.069 
CTE Coeff. 0.047   -0.3 -0.215 0.044 0.14 0.156 -0.133 0.012 -0.033 -0.192 -0.046 0.051 -0.04 -0.069 0.081 0.083 
p-value 0.314   0 0 0.345 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.79 0.484 0.002 0.323 0.277 0.397 0.139 0.082 0.075 
LNMCAP Coeff. 0.034 -0.288   0.164 -0.04 -0.119 -0.187 0.013 -0.015 -0.023 0.307 0.097 0.014 0.308 0.212 0.019 0.098 
p-value 0.465 0   0 0.389 0.011 0 0.777 0.753 0.624 0 0.037 0.77 0 0 0.684 0.035 
REGIND Coeff. 0.149 -0.215 0.127   -0.052 0.028 -0.189 -0.373 0.143 0.119 0.051 -0.089 -0.204 0.108 -0.073 -0.071 -0.095 
p-value 0.001 0 0.006   0.267 0.544 0 0 0.002 0.012 0.423 0.056 0 0.021 0.119 0.128 0.042 
GROWTH Coeff. -0.031 0.239 -0.071 -0.186   0.013 0.152 0.073 -0.078 -0.08 -0.054 -0.006 0.026 -0.049 -0.009 0.05 -0.084 
p-value 0.503 0 0.128 0   0.777 0.001 0.116 0.093 0.09 0.39 0.895 0.574 0.294 0.855 0.289 0.073 
SEO Coeff. -0.12 0.14 -0.132 0.028 -0.04   0.099 -0.072 0.225 -0.025 -0.016 0.081 0.049 0.001 -0.046 0.058 0.022 
p-value 0.01 0.003 0.005 0.544 0.39   0.034 0.124 0 0.598 0.799 0.083 0.294 0.983 0.326 0.212 0.637 
RET_OWN Coeff. 0.28 0.109 -0.129 -0.136 0.237 0.098   0.141 -0.136 0.004 -0.071 0.09 0.015 -0.27 0.127 0.015 0.069 
p-value 0 0.019 0.005 0.004 0 0.036   0.002 0.003 0.94 0.258 0.054 0.755 0 0.006 0.756 0.139 
PYRSEARN Coeff. -0.117 -0.131 0.046 -0.39 0.167 -0.116 0.092   -0.122 -0.046 0.111 0.121 0.049 -0.01 0.166 0.141 0.115 
p-value 0.012 0.005 0.328 0 0 0.013 0.048   0.009 0.336 0.077 0.009 0.297 0.837 0 0.002 0.014 
P_HOR Coeff. -0.024 0.017 -0.003 0.134 -0.061 0.226 -0.138 -0.114   -0.001 -0.158 0.327 0.024 -0.086 -0.072 -0.082 -0.037 
p-value 0.607 0.712 0.957 0.004 0.192 0 0.003 0.014   0.977 0.012 0 0.603 0.067 0.124 0.079 0.432 
F_HOR Coeff. 0.148 -0.027 -0.01 0.123 -0.089 -0.024 -0.027 -0.036 -0.006   -0.05 0.038 -0.015 -0.081 -0.009 -0.003 0.015 
p-value 0.002 0.576 0.837 0.01 0.061 0.607 0.57 0.443 0.902   0.438 0.422 0.749 0.089 0.856 0.952 0.747 
NEWS Coeff. -0.11 -0.225 0.351 0.065 -0.103 -0.022 -0.085 0.12 -0.182 -0.019   -0.088 0.044 0.132 0.047 0.014 -0.012 
p-value 0.08 0 0 0.301 0.102 0.732 0.177 0.057 0.004 0.768   0.163 0.483 0.035 0.46 0.822 0.854 
UFC_TOT Coeff. 0.088 -0.033 0.074 -0.112 -0.001 0.096 0.095 0.173 0.424 0.056 -0.116   0.085 -0.058 0.151 0.094 0.051 
p-value 0.059 0.486 0.114 0.016 0.985 0.04 0.041 0 0 0.239 0.065   0.069 0.211 0.001 0.044 0.272 
UWRITER Coeff. -0.073 0.051 0.064 -0.204 0.06 0.049 -0.011 0.038 0.036 -0.018 0.027 0.093   0.013 0.009 0.098 -0.086 
p-value 0.116 0.277 0.17 0 0.197 0.294 0.813 0.414 0.444 0.706 0.664 0.046   0.778 0.855 0.036 0.067 
AUDITOR Coeff. -0.16 -0.04 0.308 0.108 -0.132 0.001 -0.24 0.021 -0.068 -0.062 0.149 -0.057 0.013   0.098 0.086 0.126 
p-value 0.001 0.397 0 0.021 0.005 0.983 0 0.656 0.145 0.195 0.017 0.218 0.778   0.035 0.067 0.007 
AUDCOM Coeff. 0.136 -0.074 0.215 -0.065 0.06 -0.043 0.122 0.228 -0.058 -0.014 0.058 0.128 -0.004 0.11   0.299 0.345 
p-value 0.004 0.115 0 0.161 0.2 0.362 0.009 0 0.216 0.765 0.361 0.006 0.927 0.018   0 0 
CHAIR Coeff. 0.058 0.099 -0.007 -0.088 0.104 0.077 -0.007 0.162 -0.044 0.013 -0.004 0.116 0.103 0.053 0.295   0.36 
p-value 0.212 0.033 0.883 0.061 0.026 0.099 0.884 0 0.342 0.792 0.944 0.013 0.028 0.253 0   0 
INDIR Coeff. 0.083 0.078 0.135 -0.052 -0.085 0.005 0.015 0.093 -0.015 0.029 -0.011 0.022 -0.092 0.141 0.328 0.311   
p-value 0.074 0.097 0.004 0.267 0.067 0.92 0.742 0.047 0.756 0.548 0.861 0.632 0.049 0.003 0 0   
 
See Table 6 for variable descriptions.  
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Table 9 
Regression Results – Accuracy of Prospectus Forecasts 
PFEit (or PFESIZEit) = α + β1REGYEARit + β2CTEit + β3LNMCAPit + + β4REGINDit + β5GROWTHit + β6SEOit + β7RET_OWNit 
+ β8PYRSEARNit + β9P_HORit +  β10UWRITERit + β11AUDITORit + β12AUDCOMit + β13CHAIRit + β14INDIRit  + εit                       
(1)                                                                                                                                                          
Panel A: Prospectus Forecast Error Bias (PFE) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
All  CTE Firms  Non-CTE Firms 
   Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff.    t-stat.  Coeff.    t-stat. 
Intercept  27.280 2.028** 71.817 1.885**  5.639 2.572**
REGYEAR - -2.866 -1.698* -10.520 -2.029**  0.167 0.440
CTE + 3.814 2.249**     
LNMCAP - -1.068 -1.985** -2.161 -1.465  -0.346 -3.222***
REGIND - -2.113 -2.153** -5.529 -2.091**  -0.996 -1.991**
GROWTH + -0.004 -1.039 -0.023 -1.524  0.000 0.546
SEO - -3.003 -1.696* -12.408 -2.111**  0.393 1.215
RET_OWN - -3.931 -1.225 -5.474 -0.806  0.413 0.794
PYRSEARN - -0.566 -0.949 -1.874 -0.903  -0.339 -1.627
P_HOR + 0.014 2.467*** 0.046 2.457***  0.003 2.045**
UWRITER - 1.551 1.712* 8.878 1.993**  0.413 1.253
AUDITOR - -2.228 -1.118 -5.198 -1.194  -0.434 -1.082
AUDCOM - -0.349 -0.322 -1.062 -0.491  -0.214 -1.054
CHAIR - 2.107 2.333** 3.939 2.101**  0.311 1.626
INDIR - 0.276 0.068 -5.866 -0.527  2.309 1.99**
Adj. R2/F-stat  0.047 2.50 0.097 2.45  0.060 2.23
Panel B: Prospectus Forecast Error Size (PFESIZE) 
Intercept  26.649 1.984** 73.065 1.921**  4.622 2.161**
REGYEAR - -2.724 -1.619 -9.989 -1.933**  0.139 0.377
CTE + 4.045 2.392**     
LNMCAP - -1.031 -1.920** -2.203 -1.495  -0.290 -2.784***
REGIND - -1.967 -2.003** -5.731 -2.175**  -0.819 -1.644
GROWTH + -0.004 -1.058 -0.023 -1.510  0.000 0.379
SEO - -3.062 -1.732* -12.479 -2.127**  0.389 1.227
RET_OWN - -3.770 -1.178 -5.287 -0.779  0.509 1.031
PYRSEARN - -0.480 -0.806 -1.649 -0.798  -0.273 -1.316
P_HOR + 0.015 2.515*** 0.047 2.513***  0.003 2.075**
UWRITER - 1.558 1.720* 8.932 2.007**  0.347 1.078
AUDITOR - -2.101 -1.057 -4.903 -1.130  -0.456 -1.159
AUDCOM - -0.259 -0.240 -0.889 -0.413  -0.187 -0.940
CHAIR - 2.126 2.357** 3.916 2.107**  0.295 1.628
INDIR - -0.187 -0.046 -7.289 -0.656  2.301 2.010**
Adj. R2/F-stat  0.046 2.48 0.0965 2.44  0.0509 2.03
N  460  190   270 
*,**,*** significant at the 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively (two-tailed). All t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. In Panel A, ERROR= PFE: the prospectus forecast error bias or the relative 
directional forecast error, measured as the difference between forecasted earnings in the prospectus and the actual reported 
earnings, scaled by the absolute value of forecasted earnings; In Panel B, ERROR = PFE Size: the size of the prospectus forecast 
error, measured as the absolute value of difference between forecasted earnings in the prospectus and the actual reported earnings, 
scaled by the absolute value of forecasted earnings; see Table 6 for all other variable descriptions.
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Table 10 
Regression Results – Accuracy of Final Forecast Revisions  
FINAL FEit (or FINALFE_SIZEit) = α +γ1REGYEARit + γ2CTEit + γ3LNMCAPit + γ4REGINDit + γ5GROWTHit  + γ6SEOit + γ7RET_OWNit + γ8PYRSEARNit + γ9F_HORit + γ10NEWSit + γ11UFC_TOTit + γ12AUDITORit + γ13AUDCOMit + γ14CHAIRit + γ15INDIRit + εit                                                                                       (2) 
Panel A: Final Forecast Error Bias (FINALFE) 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign All  CTE Firms  Non-CTE Firms 
  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff.   t-stat.  Coeff.   t-stat. 
Intercept  10.581 1.908*  48.073 1.789*  1.094 1.502 
REGYEAR - -2.328 -1.777*  -6.129 -1.741*  -0.109 -0.671 
CTE + 1.893 1.334       
LNMCAP - -0.332 -1.855*  -1.669 -1.568  -0.103 -1.948* 
REGIND - -0.934 -1.129  -3.205 -1.512  -0.183 -0.752 
GROWTH + 0.001 0.123  0.007 0.468  0.000 -0.106 
SEO - -1.730 -1.234  -5.385 -1.525  0.453 2.418*** 
RET_OWN - -3.807 -1.109  -15.330 -1.335  0.400 0.897 
PYRSEARN - 0.248 0.481  0.535 0.285  0.079 1.427 
F_HOR + 0.004 1.920*  0.002 0.628  0.003 1.486 
NEWS - -2.280 -2.402**  -1.990 -1.300  -0.782 -5.278*** 
UFC_TOT - -0.655 -2.173**  -2.012 -1.965**  -0.129 -2.233** 
AUDITOR - -0.353 -0.192  -0.342 -0.088  0.206 1.286 
AUDCOM - -1.428 -0.935  -3.210 -1.051  -0.124 -1.029 
CHAIR - 1.483 1.187  3.101 0.907  0.318 1.229 
INDIR - 0.296 0.073  -4.408 -0.429  0.218 0.654 
Adj. R2/F-stat  0.0209 1.65  0.0370 1.52  0.1898 5.50 
Panel B: Final Forecast Error Size (FINALFE_ SIZE ) 
Intercept  10.253 1.846*  47.862 1.783*  0.853 1.172 
REGYEAR - -2.320 -1.773*  -6.168 -1.752*  -0.043 -0.271 
CTE + 2.091 1.476       
LNMCAP - -0.322 -1.789*  -1.656 -1.557  -0.094 -1.789* 
REGIND - -0.818 -0.987  -3.035 -1.422  -0.116 -0.480 
GROWTH + 0.001 0.143  0.007 0.496  0.000 -0.467 
SEO - -1.728 -1.234  -5.462 -1.550  0.492 2.687*** 
RET_OWN - -3.994 -1.167  -16.081 -1.409  0.360 0.814 
PYRSEARN - 0.264 0.513  0.573 0.305  0.078 1.365 
F_HOR + 0.004 1.918*  0.002 0.648  0.003 1.507 
NEWS - -1.954 -2.060**  -1.484 -0.967  -0.503 -3.503*** 
UFC_TOT - -0.635 -2.140**  -1.920 -1.912**  -0.144 -2.535** 
AUDITOR - -0.353 -0.193  -0.342 -0.088  0.205 1.302 
AUDCOM - -1.413 -0.926  -3.237 -1.061  -0.078 -0.660 
CHAIR - 1.467 1.174  3.125 0.912  0.314 1.223 
INDIR - 0.512 0.125  -3.894 -0.38  0.292 0.868 
Adj. R2/F-stat  0.0193 1.60  0.0366 1.51  0.1637 4.76 
N  460   190   270  
*,**,*** significant at the 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively (two-tailed). All t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. FINALFE = final forecast error bias or the relative directional forecast error, 
measured as the difference between the last earnings figure forecasted during the forecast period and the actual reported earnings, 
scaled by the absolute value of forecasted earnings; FINALFE SIZE = final forecast error size, measured as the absolute value of 
the difference between the last earnings figure forecasted during the forecast period and the actual reported earnings, scaled by the 
absolute value of forecasted earnings; NEWS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if actual earnings meet or exceed the 
prospectus forecast (good news outcome), and 0 otherwise (bad news outcome). See Table 6 for all other variable descriptions. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The Australian Securities Exchange was named the Australian Stock Exchange during the period of this study.  
2 Our focus in this study is on IPO forecast accuracy and not IPO forecast frequency. However, in separate 
analysis we find IPO forecast frequency has significantly declined in the post-CLERP Act period; thus 
confirming the findings of Chapple et al. (2005).  
3The fundraising provisions in the Corporations Act 2001are not materially different from the old Corporations 
Law.  
4 The specific disclosures are: the terms and conditions of the offer; the interests of the directors, proposed 
directors, advisors, promoters and underwriters of the company; the fees and benefits to the directors, proposed 
directors and advisors of the company; the admission of the securities or the application for the admission of the 
securities to quotation on a financial market; the expiry date of the prospectus; and the fact that the prospectus 
has been lodged with ASIC.   
5 In PN67, prospective financial information included forecasts and projections. Projections are based on 
hypothetical assumptions and unlike forecasts do not have to be based on reasonable grounds. In contrast, 
PS170 does not allow for the inclusion of projections. Thus for simplicity, the term prospective financial 
information is henceforth referred to as forecasts. 
6 PN67 uses the term “reasonable basis”. 
7  In June 1999 the NYSE changed its rules to allow very large firms (with market capitalisation over $1 billion) 
to enter without the three-year history of profitability requirement (Klein and Mohanram 2005).  
8 The ASX’s ‘profit test’ required firms to have profits of at least $1 million over the previous three years (LR 
1.2.4) and $400,000 or more in profit during the year prior to listing (LR 1.2.5).  
9 LR1.3.2(b) also applies to firms that are already listed on the ASX but change their business activities. Under 
LR11.1.3, entities which change their activities and have capital raising which results in them holding more that 
50% of assets in cash, have to satisfy the requirements of LR1.2.3(b) as if they are applying for admission. 
These entities are in effect CTEs and are subject to the same listing rules as newly-listed CTEs. A common 
example from the dot com boom-period is mining companies changing their activities to high technology 
businesses.  
10  LR4.7B came into effect on 31 March 2000. The format of the quarterly cash flow report is prescribed in 
Appendix 4C of the Listing Rules. Under LR4.7B the ASX can extend the CTE quarterly disclosure provisions 
to certain non-CTE entities ‘as if’ they are newly listed following certain events such as a major change in 
business activities.  
11 In Australia only CTEs and mining exploration companies are required to provide quarterly reports.  
12 The joint surveillance followed ASIC’s Guidance and Discussion Paper “Heard it on the Grapevine” released 
in November 1999 which was aimed at improving the effectiveness of the continuous disclosure regime. 
13 Listing rule 3.1 has certain carve-out provisions, which principally relate to not requiring disclosure of 
proprietary information and information about highly uncertain events.   
14 Chapter 6CA (s674-678) of the Corporations Act replaced s1001 and s1005 of the Corporations Law on 15 
July 2001, and the only change to the continuous disclosure provisions is the introduction of s678, which allows 
for the application of the Criminal Code to continuous disclosure contraventions.  
15 For example, Baginski, Hassell and Kimborough (2002) report that in the less-litigious Canadian 
environment, firms make more frequent earnings forecasts containing good news compared to their US 
counterparts. 
16 This argument is consistent with the growing body of international evidence showing the effectiveness of 
corporate regulation needs to be considered jointly with enforcement mechanisms. For example, Bhattacharya 
and Daour (2002) show that insider trading laws are not effective in reducing the cost of capital in a country 
until after the first prosecution.    
17 This is the equivalent of the forecast horizon variable used in this study. 
18 Consistent with the findings of Gallery, Gallery and Hsu (2002), sensitivity analysis reveals that this industry 
dichotomy is robust to alternative specifications. 
19 The SPPR database was sourced from the Centre for Research in Finance at the (then) Australian Graduate 
School of Management, University of New South Wales. 
20 For example, Global Seafood Limited lodged the IPO prospectus on 8 September 1999 and released its first 
preliminary report to the public on 15 September 1999, the same day it listed on the ASX. 
21 Earnings represent NPAT, EBIT, or EBITDA, depending on the level of earnings forecasted in the 
prospectus. The closest available level of earnings to NPAT is used as a basis for measuring prospectus forecast 
error.  In contrast to Chapple et al. (2005), the denominator is the absolute value of the forecasted earnings 
rather than the forecasted earnings to eliminate the effect of a reversal in direction caused by a negative 
denominator. Our forecast error measurement method is consistent with prior research (see  Cheng  and Firth, 
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2000). Following Cheung et al, (2000) and How and Yeo (2001) we also use issue size as the denominator and 
obtain results (not reported) that are qualitatively similar.  
22 Beekes and Brown (2006) provide Australian evidence that better governed firms make more informative 
(price-sensitive) disclosures.  
23 In Model 2 LNMCAP, GROWTH and RET_OWN are measured at balance date of the corresponding forecast 
period.   
24 The explanatory power of the Table 9 models (adjusted R2) are lower than those in Chapple et al. (2005) 
which can be at least partly attributable to the inclusion of all our explanatory variables in our models. We keep 
all non-significant variables in the model because our theoretical arguments support their inclusion and we 
wanted to show that other factors did not impact on REGYEAR and CTE – our variables of interest.   
25 Although the requirement for Appendix 4C reporting, via ASX Listing Rule 4.7B, was only established on 31 
March 2000, the IPO firms that listed in 1998, 1999, and early 2000 who later became subject to this 
requirement were coded as CTE firms in order to capture the differences between the forecasting characteristics 
of all firms that fall under the CTE category before and after Listing Rule 4.7B was enacted by the ASX. 
